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Abstract:
To understand why the Christian gospel has success amid one
culture, while seeming to fail in similar, neighboring cultures, one must look
to additional factors than those often cited by missionary sources. Some of
these factors would include the socio -political and religious context of
each of those cultures in question, in addition to the prior encounters with
Christianity and the reactions to the gospel by the receiving cultures. To
illustrate this need, this paper analyzes the contexts of Japan and Korea
during the period of Japanese expansion and wartime (1894 – 1945),
and looks specifically at what was happening in the other major religions
present at the time (Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shintoism), which would
include their responses to the Christian missionary presence.
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Introduction
When considering the means used by the Holy Spirit in whether
or not an individual, or an entire people group, accept the gospel and make
it their own, missiologists often make it their focus to seek explanations
that could explain why, historically, one embraces Christ, while another –
presented with the same message, and sometimes even having similarities
in methods used and situations experienced – rejects Christ. In the case
of people groups, these same circumstances and prevailing worldview
considerations also impact the shape of that Christianity that develops in
the local context, as it becomes embraced and indigenized.
This essay will look specifically at two nations – Japan and Korea
– to compare their relative responses to the Christian gospel. These two
nations, despite the similarities and connections with one another as fellow
East Asian nations, have had radically different reactions to Christianity
– Japan predominantly rejecting its claims, and Korea – especially in the
South – embracing Christianity and eventually becoming a major player in
Christian missions.
While there are significant factors that developed later on
historically, in addition to cultural and theological factors that must also be
considered, this paper will specifically analyze this question through the
lens of the other major religions that surrounded the churches during the
period of Japanese expansion and wartime (1894 – 1945), at which time the
general trajectory of Christianity in both countries seemed to diverge and
move in opposite directions.
Prior to this period, there were several parallel similarities between
the two countries regarding their general response to Christianity. Roman
Catholic missionaries had been active on Japan’s shores in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, and in Korea, during the eighteenth century.
Both nations would initially welcome this new faith with curiosity toward
its differences, and yet both would later become scandalized by Catholic
Christianity and close their borders to foreigners as a result, expelling
all missionaries and persecuting the native Christians, thus causing the
fledgling church in each nation to go underground.1 Both nations later had
their borders forcibly opened through gunboat diplomacy in the latter half
of the nineteenth century, followed soon after by the arrival of Protestant
missionaries and the return of Roman Catholicism. Also, both had an initial
period where conversion to the new faith was officially forbidden, which
was later removed. Finally, both had been experiencing a period of rapid
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church growth immediately preceding this period in question. Yet, beginning
in the 1890’s, things would change. While Christianity would continue to
experience rapid growth in Korea, it would become marginalized in Japan.
Why did this change occur?
One possible explanation is to explore what was happening
among Christianity’s major opponents (namely, Buddhism, Shintoism, and
Confucianism) during this time period, specifically at their response to the
presence and activity of Christianity. For this, I will address each religion
in turn, discussing the context of each, as well as how it responded to
Christianity, in hope that this could contribute to the discussion on why
Christianity seemed to blossom in Korean soil, but wither in Japan.
Buddhism
At the beginning of this period, Buddhism in both Korea and Japan
was in a weak and demoralized state. In Japan’s case, while it enjoyed
a prominent role under the previous government, it was in a state of
disfavor with the new Meiji government. In addition to this, it found itself
divided into numerous competing sects. In Korea, Buddhism had been
marginalized since the fourteenth century. However, this would change in
the later nineteenth century, as Buddhists from both Japan and Korea, like
other nations across the Buddhist Asian world, would seek to reform their
religion.
Global Buddhist Reinvention
On the global level in the nineteenth century, Buddhism was
seeking to reinvent itself as an historically and scientifically based religion,
in response to the aggressive mission efforts of Christians in many of the
Buddhist territories. Thus, there was a desire by Buddhists throughout Asia
to prevent themselves from losing too much ground to its very aggressively
evangelistic competitor.2 The specific developments centred on establishing
Siddhartha Gautama, also known as Sakyamuni, the historical Buddha, as
the centre of Buddhism. This became a focal point in Buddhist discourse in
response to a similar emphasis being proclaimed by Christian missionaries
when discussing the historicity of Jesus.3
According to Hwansoo Kim, the efforts to revive Buddhism
on a global level were “spearheaded by a range of actors from the West
and the East, including Western Orientalists, Buddhist sympathizers, and
Asian Buddhist reformers.”4 Of these, the two with the greatest impact
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were Colonel Henry Steel Olcott (1832-1907), one of the founders of
the Theosophist Society and the first Western convert to Buddhism, and
Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-1933), a lay Buddhist reformer from Sri
Lanka.5 Because of increasing travel and communication between the
different Buddhist regions throughout Asia at this time, as well as the
sympathetic attitudes of Orientalists and Buddha sympathizers in the West,
local practices and responses to Western colonialism and Christianity
began to affect other regions, which would also result in adaptations in the
self-consciousness of Buddhism itself.6
As part of these reclamation efforts, Dharmapala and others,
Olcott included, visited Japan, Korea, and other locations within the
Asian Buddhist world to unite Buddhists under the banner of the historical
Buddha, with the ultimate goal being the expulsion of Christian missionaries
from their collective territories.7 The Buddha’s birthday celebration was one
campaign that successfully helped to generate the rise of Buddhism as a
revived global religion. According to Hwansoo Kim, Japan would become
particularly dedicated to promoting this festival. 8
Buddhism in Japan
Not only would Japanese Buddhism become passionately devoted
to the celebration of Buddha’s Birthday (called Hana Matsuri in Japan); they
would also send individual travellers to other parts of Asia, as explorers,
missionaries, and even a delegation to the World Parliament of Religions
conference in 1893, and repurpose a document written by a Christian into
an apologetic argument about the West’s fascination with Buddhism (and,
with it, the loss of Western interest in Christianity).
Prior to the renovations in Buddhism happening during this
modernization process, the Japanese Buddha’s Birthday celebration had
occurred inside Buddhist temples, similar to other locations in Asia. The
celebration was also generally held according to the older lunar calendar.
However, after the renovation, with the encouragement of Olcott and
Dharmapala, the festivals began to be held in public streets, university
campuses, and private institutes, and the lunar calendar was replaced by the
solar Gregorian calendar. Initially, it was run by Buddhist youth groups, with
no official backing from the various Buddhist sects. This changed in 1916,
however, when the Japanese Buddhists finally united for the celebration.9
By 1926, Hana Matsuri was embraced by the Japanese government as one
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of the symbols indicating Japan as the ideal leader of Asia and a prominent
player in the political and religious arena of the world.10
An additional resource that the Japanese Buddhists used to reestablish themselves within their society was The Gospel of Buddha, a
publication by a German-American Christian author, Paul Carus. Carus’
original intent with this work was to propagate his version of Christianity
as being the fulfillment of Buddhism’s aspirations, with Jesus being the
Maitreya – the final great teacher to fulfil the teachings of Buddhism.
Carus described Buddhism as a predecessor to Christianity, as well as a
prominent contender for the souls of the world, which should be learned
from as a highly philosophical and scientific faith.11 He had, in fact, been
highly impressed by the presentation of Eastern Buddhism by the Japanese
delegates at the World Parliament of Religions conference a few years
before publishing his work. According to Judith Snodgrass, “the Buddhism
they presented… was a rationalized, secular, trans-sectarian, lay-oriented
Buddhism consciously packaged to emphasize its compatibility with
science and philosophy… and the life-affirming and humanitarian aspects
of Buddhism.”12 In his work, Carus presented his views of the natural
evolution of religion (a popular view of the time), with Buddhism naturally
giving way to Christianity, its fulfilment.
However, this was not how it was interpreted nor used by the
Japanese Buddhists. Instead, they used it as an apologetic tool to point toward
how Westerners (who were viewed by Japanese as being predominantly
Christian) were developing a deep interest in Buddhism (thus, losing faith in
Christianity), and that Buddhism of the East could pose a threat to Christian
(Western) religious hegemony. In other words, it was used to convince
those Japanese who had been drawn toward Christianity because of the
technological superiority of the West to reconsider their previous decisions
to embrace that new faith, and as part of an argument that Japan could be
recognized as an equal to the West in science, technology and intellect,
but needed to remain strong as a decidedly Eastern culture against Western
spiritual dominance.13 In other words, despite Carus’s original intent for the
Gospel of Buddha, it was used in Japan, as elsewhere, as an ingredient in
the reformulation and rebranding of Buddhism as a modern, scientific, and
philosophically sophisticated religion.
Part of the reason for this desire for Buddhism to reinvent itself
in Japan was that with the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the
restoration of imperial rule in the new Meiji government, Buddhism as a
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faith found itself both deeply divided and radically out of favor. According
to Richard Jaffe, “although the Tokugawa regime had regarded the Buddhist
clergy as a crucial aide in the maintenance of religious and social order,
nativists, Shintoists, and many members of the new Meiji regime demonized
them as un-Japanese, parasitic, and corrupt.”14 It was also viewed by the
Meiji government as being a “feudal and superstitious religion antithetical
to modernization and Westernization.”15 As such, the Meiji government
sought to eliminate Japanese Buddhism altogether. It was out of this context
that Japanese Buddhism now began to look outside of itself – especially
since commercial shipping with other nations were opening Japan up to the
world – to reimagine a Buddhism that would once again thrive in a rapidly
changing Japan.16 Among many of these travellers from Japan to the rest of
Asia, the plight of several of these other nations, especially those under the
heels of Western imperialists, caused a realization that unless they learned
to successfully compete with the so-called Christian world, they would
suffer the same fate of servility to the arrogance and brutality of Western
rulers.17
Buddhism in Korea
Like its Japanese counterpart, Buddhism in Korea was in need
of a re-invention of itself. During the Joseon period (1392-1910), it had
found itself relegated to isolated mountain monasteries, and was prevented
access from the principle avenues of power.18 Additionally, the tradition of
Buddhism within Korea itself was divided between complete detachment
from the everyday lives of the people, with an “elitist, clergy-centred
institutional tradition” on the one hand, and “diffused, ‘shamanistic’
religious practices” of lay Buddhists on the other.19 To a degree, the antiBuddhist sentiments during the Joseon period could be partly to blame for
this situation. However, it should also be noted that the impediments that
the Buddhist reformers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
sought to address were actually inherent, structurally, within Buddhism
itself – particularly of the Son school, which was the most prominent in
Korea at this time.20 As a system, Son Buddhism focusses on meditative
practices and the denial of the physical world for the sake of the spiritual,
not on the public teaching of doctrine. It was this world-denial and nihilism
that resulted in some of Neo-Confucianism’s deepest criticisms of that
religion, which then led to its earlier marginalization.21
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The Buddha’s Birthday celebration in Korea first developed during
the Koryo period. They were originally state-sponsored events with the
intention of national unity and communal prayers for the royal family. The
event included a lantern festival, celebrated by lighting lanterns and reading
Buddhist sutras. Despite the anti-Buddhist policies of the Joseon period,
the festival survived, though stripped of its Buddhist meanings. It became
more like a State holiday, where families would gather at the festival, light
lanterns and entertain themselves in the commercial districts.22 However,
from the later nineteenth century, similar to their Japanese counterparts,
Korean Buddhist monks began to study in other parts of Asia, especially
China and Japan, and several of these reformers emphasized the centrality
of the historical Buddha, which included a resuscitation of the Buddha’s
Birthday celebration.23 According to Hwansoo Kim, Korea’s native version
of this holiday was already undergoing modernization before Japanese
Buddhists began introducing their own version to the peninsula.24
Into this situation, during the period of Japanese expansion,
various Japanese Buddhist sects sent missionaries to proselytize, each
competing with one another for a piece of the Korean Buddhist pie. The
relationship between Japanese and Korean Buddhists during this time
of Japanese expansionism was anything but one of trust or confidence
between the two sides. To the Koreans, Japanese Buddhists were likened to
Christian missionary colonialists “who invaded non-Western countries with
the objective of furthering their sectarian and nation’s imperial ambitions.”25
Japanese Buddhists, for their part, viewed their Korean counterparts as
“pre-modern, moribund, backward and antisocial,” and in serious need
of guidance from their more “modern, vibrant, reformed and socially
engaged” version of Buddhism that was developing in Japan.26 However, it
was not necessarily as clear-cut as a relationship of rivalry or patronizing.
If anything, the relationships between Korean and Japanese
Buddhists was more passive – with Japanese Buddhists acting, for the most
part, more like colonialists, with little interest in promoting the Buddhism of
their neighboring nation. Koreans, for their part, were embittered because
of the foreign rule, and did not wish to associate with foreign invaders.27
Additionally, with the introduction of the Temple Ordinance in 1911, the
Japanese government effectively put an end to the sectarian competition
among Japanese Buddhists over Korean Buddhist territory by bringing the
administration of Korean Buddhism directly under the supervision of the
colonial government.28
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However, there were some exceptions to the policy of
disengagement. According to Hwansoo Kim, there were some on both
sides who desired to work closer together toward mutual understanding
and benefit.29 The Japanese, for their part, assisted Korean monasteries in
establishing schools, creating a central office for the monitoring of Korean
Buddhism, aiding Korean Buddhism in re-establishing itself into the center
of Korean politics, and protecting them from exploitation. Meanwhile,
Korean Buddhists were encouraged by their situations and by zealous
Japanese Buddhist missionaries (who were themselves inspired by their
nation’s imperial powers and their opposition to the threat posed by
Christianity) to join the Japanese sects that protected them.30 In other words,
the relationship between Korean Buddhism and Japanese Buddhism during
this period was highly dynamic and nuanced.
Another proof that the relationship between the Buddhist camps
was not completely antagonistic would be the March 1 Movement. Unlike
Korean Christians and the Ch’ondogyo (The Heavenly Way Religion),
who were vocal supporters of Korean independence, only two among the
leaders of the March 1 Independence Movement were Buddhists.31 What
could be seen, by contrast, is a relationship of protection and control by
the Japanese authorities toward Korean Buddhism, which allowed them
greater freedom and public visibility than under the previous dynasty.32
This increased visibility, protection from the Japanese government (as
Buddhism was recognized as a legitimate religion – alongside Christianity
and Shintoism), and its renewed image as an indigenous/ Eastern religion
(as opposed to Christianity, which was still seen as relatively foreign) made
it possible for Korean Buddhism to expand its influence.33
Shintoism
During the later Meiji Restoration in Japan and subsequent period
of expansionism, Shintoism, was also in the process of transforming itself.
This was due, to some degree, by the anxiety felt in Japan about the growing
influence of Christianity and its accompanying Western colonial powers,
and the desire to remain strong as a nation against Western dominance.
For this paper, I will be specifically analyzing the particular form of
Shintoism that was emerging: State Shintoism, its status as a “non-religious”
nationalistic religion of the Japanese Empire, and the enforcement of its
shrine worship upon the Christian churches in Korea.
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State Shintoism in Japan
In one form or another, Shintoism had existed in Japan since
ancient times. However, as a religion, it lacked a unifying ideology.
Throughout much of its known history, it has existed in syncretism with
other, more dominant, faiths – Buddhism during the medieval period, and,
from the seventeenth century, Neo-Confucianism. Similar to its relationship
with Buddhism, Shintoism altered Neo-Confucianism as it joined itself to
its ethical ideology. In addition to this, as Japan expanded its territory, it
would combine these elements with a totalitarian governmental policy
and dreams of unifying the peoples of Eastern Asia, in direct opposition
and competition with the Western Allied Powers, something referred to
by scholars as Pan-Asianism.34 This Imperial Confucianism (Kodo Jugaku)
would be the dominant form of State Shinto religion until the fall of the
Japanese Empire in 1945.35 According to Wonsuk Chang, “In the wake of
Perry’s expedition to Japan… Japan transformed itself along the Western
model of the aggressive nation state” and “defined itself as a paradox, part
of a larger community of oppressed Asian nations standing against Western
hegemony, while also being the most Westernized, civilized country among
the Asian nations.”36
To accomplish this dream of a Pan-Asian empire, the Japanese
state sought to unite various elements of Japanese culture, including the
semi-autonomous system of Shrine Shintoism, into a newly structured
state religion.37 Specifically, it was these three contents of Shrine Shintoism
that the State sought to capitalize on: the myth of the eternal reign of the
imperial family, the central importance of the kami (Divine spirits/ gods),
particularly Amaterasu, the sun goddess thought to be the divine ancestor
of the emperor, and Japan’s superiority over other nations.38 In fact, the
Shintoism of the early 20th Century assumed a world dominated by Japan,
and that other lands, including China, (which was previously viewed as the
primary center of civilization in the East Asian milieu) would pay tribute to
Japan.39
Between 1868 and 1945, Shintoism increasingly became
influenced and controlled by the state, as the Japanese government sought
to utilize the beliefs already inherent in Shintoism, in addition to the worship
at Shinto’s shrines, as one of the principle driving forces behind galvanizing
the loyalty of the Japanese populace to the Japanese imperial ambitions.40
Wilbur Fridell also mentions certain other elements that existed outside of
traditional Shinto discourse that were central elements to the State Shinto
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apparatus (such as national holidays, the national Meiji Constitution, and
the Imperial Rescript on Education).41 In other words, the religion known
as Shinto (shrine Shinto) was only one of several elements that were being
used by the Japanese government to accomplish this development of the
Imperial Shinto system.42
With this all being said, it was not simply a top-down campaign
propagated by a power-hungry government. On the contrary, the people of
Japan in that period seemed to actively embrace this initiative.43 According
to Shimazono Susumu, “people at all levels of society can be viewed as
active participants in State Shinto, supporting and rallying around it.”44 As he
continues, however, he points out that the institutional State Shinto, aligned
with the militarist, totalitarian ideologues of the Imperial State, and the Shrine
Shinto of the common people, which represents the religious side of Shinto,
were not always in complete agreement.45 Additionally, while the State did
have some forms of control and oversight over the shrine system during this
period (under a different arm of the government than “religions,” such as
Christianity and Buddhism), the shrines under the government during that
period remained relatively weak, both economically and politically.46 What
we can get from this is that the religion of Shintoism and the Shintoism of
the State, while related to one another, were not equivalent.
However, because the religious worldview known as Shinto was
one aspect of the picture that was being formed by the Japanese government
in the development of State Shinto, seeking to define Shintoism as a religion
is a murky undertaking at best – especially since the self-identification of
Shintoism at that time in question (and also, in some ways, even today)
was one more of nationalistic patriotism and expressions of Japanese
culture, much like the rituals and holidays that citizens of another country
would perform at certain specified occasions.47 It was this “non-religious”
nationalistic patriotism that would cause problems in Japan’s colonies,
including Korea, particularly for the nascent Christian church.
The Shinto Shrine Controversy in Korea
Although it may be true that Christianity was officially protected
as a legal religion during the Colonial period, the reality of the relationship
between the Japanese Shinto state and the Christian church was somewhat
convoluted and opaque. For instance, only native Korean Christians were
prominent in the March 1 Independence movement (while the Western
missionaries actually discouraged this political activity). However, these
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same missionaries, although uninvolved in the movement itself, drew global
attention and criticism from their worldwide sources toward the atrocities
committed by the Japanese in its aftermath.48 Also, because Christianity was
already deeply entrenched in Korea by the time Japan officially annexed
Korea in 1910, the missionaries were able to attain certain concessions to
further expand their presence through education, healthcare, and social
work in the peninsula, especially in the major city centers.49 For the most
part, Western Christian missionaries hoped to maintain good relationships
with the Japanese by expressing support for colonial rule – which is
part of the reason for why, despite Korean Christians’ prominence in the
Independence Movement, the missionaries were, for the most part, silent
until the aftermath.50 This, alongside other controversial incidents, should
illustrate the convoluted history of missionary Christianity in Korea during
this period.
This opaque understanding would only become more
pronounced in the later years of the Colonial period, and these two forces
(Christianity and State Shinto) would come into direct confrontation with
one another. The Manchurian Incident, a battle pretexting Japan’s invasion
of Northeastern China, produced the need in the Japanese government’s
minds for increasing the intensity of the “Japanization” of Korea. Japan
needed the material and human resources present in Korea, in addition to
the strategic position of the peninsula in their expansionist thrust. For this,
they needed to guarantee the loyalty of their Korean subjects.51 They sought
to do this by urging the Korean population, at any cost, to offer worship and
reverence at the Shinto shrines. Prior to 1932, these rites were completely
optional; however, beginning in 1932, all school personnel – principals,
teachers, and students – were now required to attend and participate in
ceremonies at Shinto shrines and pay special homage and reverence toward
the Japanese emperor.52
Because education was one of the primary ministries of Christian
missionaries in Korea, this would become problematic. In fact, one could
argue that this was the issue among Christians in Korea at the time, and
one of the primary reasons for the later factionalization of the church. On
the one hand, it was required by the government, who had been insisting
since 1900 that the shrine worship “was not a religious act, but a political
expression of patriotism,”53 and the American missionaries wished to remain
on friendly terms with the Japanese, so that they could continue operating
in the peninsula. At the same time, it was also viewed by several Christians
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as being a form of religious observance and, thus, idolatry, especially given
the difference between the monotheism declared in Christianity and the
polytheism inherent in Shintoism. Naturally, this would cause division
in the ranks among the Christian denominations – with the Catholics and
Methodists, for the most part, cooperating (thus, being allowed to keep
their schools operational), while the Presbyterians were divided between
a minority who also participated and a majority that refused to cooperate
(and closed their schools).54 The other Protestant denominations represented
in Korea, whose numbers were not as significant as those mentioned,
generally went one way or the other.
At least part of the reason for this divide that seemingly split
across denominational lines could be attributed to church governance
structures of the denominations in question. For the Catholics, because
the Pope declared it acceptable, the church followed his lead.55 Likewise,
because the Methodists also possessed an episcopal governance structure,
the denomination generally went in the direction decided by the bishops,
despite any misgivings of individuals within the denomination.56 Among the
Presbyterians, on the other hand, who participated in a more egalitarian,
consular form of church government, determined by regions, this gave more
independence to each regional body, which allowed for more voices of
dissent to be heard.57 Additionally, while the Presbyterians were generally
more exclusivist in their approach to other religions, the Methodists and
Catholics were usually more inclusivist and sympathetic.58
Confucianism
During the Joseon Dynasty in what is today Korea, NeoConfucianism enjoyed both popularity and prestige. In fact, it was the
dominant ideology of the time, and the Korean Confucian Scholarly
class (the Yangban) took great pride in their loyalty to Neo-Confucian
doctrines and social ethics. The government examination system had
become so perfected that, unlike in the Chinese system, the adoption of
Neo-Confucianism and everything accompanying it served to preserve the
stability of the Korean society.59 In fact, it was even believed by some that
Joseon was the only remaining true heir of the Confucian tradition that it
had inherited from China.60 However, this changed drastically when Japan
annexed Korea in 1910. Almost overnight, Confucianism was deprived of
its previous monopolizing position in the official courts of the land and had
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lost considerable societal power.61 While its influence on Korean society
didn’t die out completely (as it continued to live on in the rural centers,
and Korean cultural mores, language, and even Korean Christianity,
have all retained certain aspects of Confucianism), its official powers as
an institution were essentially stripped away. However, the seeds for this
dissolution were present before that final point.
Consider, for example, the perspective taken by the Japanese
toward Confucianism itself, despite the fact that State Shinto used Confucian
ethics as part of its ideological makeup during this time. To the Japanese
mind, which at this point was focussed on expansion and advancement
to compete effectively with Western powers, pure Confucianism and its
focus on the past and contradictory emphases and influences were seen
as central to the problem of what Japan perceived as backwardness in its
peninsular neighbor.62 In fact, there was even a sense of Japanese superiority
because of the relative peace enjoyed by her people, politically, especially
when comparing itself to that of China, the epicenter of Confucianism.
This comparison is especially stark when the central Shinto belief of the
unbroken lineage of their emperors is considered, when compared to the
changing dynasties of both Korea and China (who were both nations that
based their political philosophy on Confucianism).63
As Wonsuk Chang would point out, even among intellectuals in
Korea at the time, Confucianism was already beginning to be seen in a less
than ideal light. It was viewed as “a shackling ideology of backwardness,
oppression, hierarchism, laziness, and hypocrisy, and thereby incompatible
with modern values such as individualism, tolerance and freedom.”64 It was
increasingly seen as being powerless and useless.
Additionally, this perception would only be exasperated if one
were to reflect upon the events surrounding the Sino-Japanese War (18941895), when Japan defeated the Chinese forces in a series of battles for
the control of the peninsula, as well as the series of failed rebellions and
coups by those of the more conservative Confucian factions.65 When
coupling this with the introduction of Christianity and Western culture
at around the same time, this would result in a perfect storm against the
Confucian ideology. Each of these factors, when combined with the loss of
Confucianism’s state prominence and the impact of modernism on Korean
society, has resulted in Confucianism becoming marginalized, with very
few Koreans after that point claiming any religious allegiance toward it.66
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However, while Confucianism as a specific movement or “religion” may
have become marginalized in both countries, its values continue to live on
in the South Korean and Japanese cultures of today.
Changes Brought by Christianity
The introduction of Protestant Christianity into both Japan and
Korea in the latter half of the nineteenth century brought considerable
change to both contexts. Quite significant was the alteration to the
religious environment, especially as each of the religions covered above
were forced to deal not only with a new contender to the religious scene,
accompanying the technologically and militarily superior Western powers,
but also a new way to think about religion itself. To a lesser degree, we
could see this change already happening with the earlier introduction
of Catholicism67 It was actually the introduction of Christianity, with its
emphasis on denominationalism and religious exclusivism that would
result in an alteration in this understanding of religion.
A Changed Perspective on Religion
The traditional belief structure of the East Asian world did not
think of religions in the way that we would in the Western world. In fact, the
idea of “religion” as a distinct preference and experience of an individual
was foreign to Eastern Asia until the advent of Christianity arriving at its
shores. In fact, it would not have been unheard of for a person to believe in
and practice Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shintoism (Japan)/ Shamanism
(Korea) within the same day and not feel the contradiction. Every “religion”
had its distinct role to play in the society in both Korea and Japan. In
other words, at least as far as Japan and Korea of that time period were
concerned, this particular concept of “religion” was a product of modern
Western civilization.68 Curiously, we can see this even in new religions that
developed as blends of Catholicism and local religious beliefs during the
period of persecution in each country: the Kakure Kirishitan in Japan and
the Ch’ondogyo in Korea.
One of the surprises that the Christian missionaries found in Japan
was that the Kakure Kirishitan, the underground church, had survived,
despite the persecution, changed through centuries of isolation, and was
now re-emerging.69 Some of these “hidden Christians” would later join
either Catholic or Protestant churches; however, approximately 35,000 of
them would refuse to join either church, and instead chose to keep their
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own traditions alive.70 Currently, there are very few of these individuals
left. The majority of these live in poor farming and fishing villages around
Kyushu and its offshore islands.71 Of particular interest to this paper are the
reasons why those underground Christians chose to remain separate.
The Kakure Kirishitan beliefs are a unique blend of Christianity
with Japanese folk Shinto and Buddhism.72 That they would blend the
Catholic traditions with the indigenous ones is understandable. The official
church leadership was expelled relatively early on, and without access to
doctrinal resources and fearful of persecution, these Christians needed to
hide their faith by changing their symbolism and hiding their beliefs in the
cultural forms of their surrounding culture.73 As for why they choose to
remain separate today, much of this has to do with honoring the tradition
of the past and the veneration of their ancestors, who willingly suffered as
Christians during the period of persecution. Additionally, as Kristian Pella
points out, they are more a Japanese Shinto-Buddhist tradition that has
incorporated Christian symbols than a completely Christian sect – and thus
an entity that would differ in teaching and appearance from other Christian
denominations, including those that would later attempt to create a fully
indigenous form of Christianity in Japan.74
Similar to the Kakure Kirishitan of Japan, the Ch’ondogyo (the
Heavenly Way) sect of Korea (also known as Tonghak, or Eastern Learning)
also developed as a blending of Catholic ideas with the native Confucian,
Buddhist, and Shamanist notions. Ch’oe Che-u (1824-1864), the illegitimate
son of an aristocrat, developed this faith in response to the corruption of the
government, incorporating the Christian concepts of equality, the Kingdom
of Heaven and the personality of God into a reformed Confucian-based
sect.75 It would be a splinter from this group that would incite a general
rebellion in Korea in 1894 that triggered the Sino-Japanese War (18941895), which, in turn, would begin the process of Japanese colonization of
the peninsula.76
This blending with the indigenous tradition is not unique in either
Japanese nor Korean histories. In Japan, Buddhism, which was introduced
through Korea in the mid sixth century CE, and Confucianism, which
also entered Japan through Korea in the third century, were both able to
reconcile themselves to the native Japanese Shintoism by adopting specific
roles within Japanese society.77 The Japanese Emperor Shotoku (574-621)
reportedly related the three religions as being the root (Shinto), the trunk
(Confucianism) and the branches (Buddhism) of the tree representing
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Japanese culture, seeking to bring peace to his divided nation. Likewise,
Korea had a similar tradition, but where Confucianism and Buddhism coexisted until the thirteenth century, when Neo-Confucianism became the
dominant worldview, and other religions – Buddhism included – were
molded to fit the needs and dictates of the Confucian royalty.78
This is one element of the general attitude toward religion
historically within East Asia, particularly both in Japan and Korea – that
different religions do not need to be mutually exclusive from one another.79
In fact, one might even say that the folk religion practiced in both Korea
and Japan was a blend of Confucian ethics, Buddhist reflection, and local
ideologies (whether Shintoism in Japan or Shamanism in Korea).
Conclusion
As I have argued in this paper, the introduction of Protestant
Christianity, accompanied by the technologically and militarily superior
Western empires, to the East Asian region brought considerable change.
In addition to dealing with a new way of understanding religion, there was
also the specific threat felt by each of these religions by Christianity itself
– a religion that, to their eyes at least, was an aggressively competitive
newcomer to the religious scene. In many ways, this is where we can begin
to see a difference in the relative response between the dominant religions
in both nations that would also determine a difference in the response
between Japan and Korea toward Christianity itself. As I have shown above,
both Buddhism and Shintoism seemed to expand and revitalize themselves
in this period, yet Confucianism seemed to wither into the background.
Regarding Buddhism, its revival in both contexts was, in many
ways, part of a global movement, and while it did expand its influence in
both Japan and Korea, it was expanding from a place of weakness in both
contexts, and so was not able to fully expel Christianity. This perceived
failure would prove to be a point of frustration for various Buddhist
leaders – most notably in the difference in social engagement and zeal
for outside proselytizing (active evangelism of nonbelievers) among their
missionaries.80 Nevertheless, although not becoming primarily dominant in
either of the two contexts, Buddhism would grow in influence as it sought
to re-invent itself and become truly competitive in light of the threat that it
perceived from Christianity.
However, it is in the difference between Shintoism in Japan
and Confucianism in Korea where one can see at least one clue as to the
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difference in responses toward Christianity. Between 1873 and the early
1890’s, Christianity in Japan became highly popular and influential, with
prominent members of the samurai and scholarly classes declaring it the
fulfilment of the Japanese bushido honor codes and beneficial for Japan to
embrace collectively.81 In the midst of this time of great popularity, Christian
missionaries expressed great optimism about the future of Christianity in
Japan. However, in the mid 1890’s, this would change considerably. Part
of this change may have been due to the Buddhist revival, but what would
become apparent, especially as Japan began to extend their territory, was
that Shintoism, in transforming itself and joining itself to the identity of
the Japanese culture and empire, was beginning to reassert itself as the
official and dominant faith, and Christianity, which had come to symbolize
Western global hegemony, and yet was becoming seen by these same
Japanese intellectuals as being rejected in the West as well, was pushed
to the side and rejected by the majority of Japanese as utterly foreign, antipatriotic, and inferior.
Meanwhile, when looking at the Korean scene, the situation
developed completely differently. The aggressor was not perceived as
the Christian West, but Shinto Japan. When the political power was
stripped from the Neo-Confucian scholar class upon Japan’s annexation,
Confucianism seemed to melt away under Japanese criticism. However,
why was there not a similar resurgence of the native religion in Korea, like
there had been in Japan? After all, there were other religions to choose from
– most notably the Chon’dogyo, which had become highly popular among
the common classes. At least part of this was the Japanese policy toward
religion in its colonies. Unlike Buddhism, Shintoism, Confucianism, and
Christianity, Chon’dogyo and other native religions of Korea were simply
not recognized as legitimate religions, and so became illegal during the
Colonial period. In addition, the Koreans believed that the United States
(the nation most closely associated with Christian missionaries in the minds
of Koreans) lacked colonial intentions toward Korea.82 Thus, to belong to a
religion that promised a chance to keep their national identity (which was
not compromised by collusion with the Japanese Imperialists), and which
promised progressive change from a decaying and corrupt system of the
past, Christianity became an obvious choice for many.83 We can see this
during the Great Revival of 1907, in addition to the March 19 Independence
Movement, as well as the rapid growth of numbers during the entire
Colonial period – growing from one percent of the total population in 1910
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(which had already shown significant growth and popularity prior to this),
to just under four percent in 1945, following liberation from Japan.84
In other words, these religious movements show us at least one
clue as to the difference between these two nations in their response to
Christianity. In Japan, the combination of Buddhist revival and the rise of
State Shinto as the official faith of nationalistic loyalty would marginalize
Christianity as foreign and unpatriotic. In Korea, meanwhile, even with the
dominance of Shintoism as the religion of the occupying Japanese Empire,
and even with the increased popularity and prominence of Buddhism in
this period, many Koreans would ultimately see Christianity as the best
alternative that would allow them to keep their national identity as a people.
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